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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates three hypotheses regarding biases of National Basketball As-
sociation (NBA) referees. Using a sample of 28,388 quarter-level observations from six seasons, we
¯nd that referees make calls that favor home teams, teams losing during games, and teams losing
in playo® series. All three biases are likely to increase league revenues. In order to distinguish
between referee and player behavior we use play-by-play data, which allow us to analyze turnovers
referees have relatively high and low discretion over separately.
JEL Classi¯cation Numbers: K42, L12, L83
Keywords: Rule Compliance, Forensic Economics, Home Bias, Persuasion, Social Pressure, Na-
tional Basketball Association (NBA).1 Introduction
All ¯rms face rules, such as tax laws, health regulations, and ethical codes, that con-
strain the actions they may take to maximize pro¯ts. How ¯rms respond to these rules
is theoretically ambiguous, as there exists a tradeo® between compliance and actions
that violate the rules but directly enhance pro¯ts. In light of this tradeo®, we examine
the behavior of National Basketball Association (NBA) referees. There are a number of
ways in which the NBA may bene¯t from its referees favoring certain teams or players;
yet, fans value the integrity of the sport and would lose interest if they perceived the
o±ciating to be systematically skewed. In this paper, we empirically test for the exis-
tence of referee biases that are likely pro¯table to the league. The results shed light on
the general question of whether ¯rms \bend the rules," despite being observed closely
by consumers and the media.
The main challenge to the empirical analysis is disentangling referee and player be-
havior. The basketball statistics most directly a®ected by referees, fouls and turnovers,
are simultaneously in°uenced by the style and quality of the players' actions, which
makes identi¯cation of bias di±cult. To account for this issue, we use play-by-play
data; these include more detailed description of plays than game-level data, and allow
us to exploit the fact that referees have varying degrees of discretion over di®erent
types of turnovers. We use the detail of the play-by-play data to classify turnovers into
two groups: \discretionary" (mainly traveling violations and o®ensive fouls) and \non-
discretionary" (mainly bad passes and lost balls).1 There is a clear dichotomy between
these two groups, as discretionary turnovers are always caused by referees blowing the
whistle while the ball is in play, while non-discretionary turnovers are either determined
directly by the players and without a referee whistle, or by the ball going out of bounds.
In other words, only discretionary turnovers involve active referee behavior while the
ball is in bounds.
Generally speaking, to test for the presence of referee bias we compare how dis-
cretionary turnovers are impacted by variables pertinent to possible bias, relative to
1A turnover occurs when the o®ensive team loses possession of the ball without taking a shot at the basket.
2how non-discretionary turnovers are a®ected. While the analysis is not a clean \treat-
ment and control" comparison{both types of turnovers are a®ected by both player
and referee behavior{identi¯cation of bias only rests on the assumption that, on av-
erage, referees have a relatively greater e®ect on discretionary turnovers, as compared
to non-discretionary turnovers. A formal model and detail on this argument are pro-
vided in Section 3. As the discretionary/non-discretionary distinction can be drawn for
turnovers but not fouls, the paper's discussion is focused on the estimates regarding
bias e®ects on turnovers, and we caution that the results on fouls are only suggestive,
though still important.
We ¯nd evidence of three biases: favoritism of home teams, teams losing during
games, and teams that are losing by at least two games in a multi-game playo® se-
ries. All three biases are plausibly pro¯t-enhancing for the following reasons. Home
favoritism increases the home court advantage, which likely increases ticket demand,
as most fans who attend games root for the home team. Biasing calls in favor of teams
losing during games keeps games close and more competitive, which likely improves
television ratings and consequently television contract values. Favoring teams losing in
multi-game playo® series increases the likelihood of additional games being played in
the series, which leads to higher ticket sales and, most likely, television revenues.
Each type of favoritism results in approximately a 5-10% advantage in discretionary
turnovers, and a 2-5% advantage in shooting fouls (for the ¯rst two types of bias).
The playo® bias results are only marginally signi¯cant, but come from a much smaller
sample. The discretionary turnover home bias is also estimated to increase by 1%
for every additional 1,000 fans in attendance. Our statistical tests are designed to
identify the existence of the biases and thus we do not estimate the e®ects of the
biases on game outcomes. While we suspect the impact on game outcomes of any
particular turnover bias would likely be small, we note that the foul e®ects may be
more substantive; Price and Wolfers (2007) ¯nd that a small e®ect (4%) on total fouls
can have a signi¯cant in°uence on win/loss outcomes. Furthermore, the e®ects of two
or three of the bias types combined together may be substantial, and even if the biases
do not often alter game win/loss outcomes, the biases a®ect the entertainment value of
3games, and thereby fans' utility.
In Section 5 we discuss possible causes of the biases. Both our priors and a number
of auxiliary empirical results lead us to believe that the biases are mainly psychosocial
and cognitive in nature. Regardless, among major professional sports, the NBA has
been particularly outspoken about the degree to which its referees are monitored. NBA
commissioner David Stern said in 2008, \We decided ¯ve years ago that we would track
literally every call in order to help develop our o±cials and make them better, and
they really e®ectively are the most measured and metricized group of employees in the
world."2 This suggests that league management has in place the type of system needed
to detect these biases. The fact that they persist suggests the league allows them to
continue in order to realize their bene¯ts or because the costs of eliminating the biases
are too high. Moreover, despite the league's statements that they have made e®orts
to improve the consistency of o±ciating starting in 2003, we ¯nd that the biases have
not decreased over time following that year, indicating the league is not focusing on
minimizing these biases in particular.3 It is also possible that league management is
unaware of the biases. If that is the case, then our paper provides an empirical strategy
that they (and similar organizations) might use to monitor these type of biases.
1.1 Related Literature
There is a growing literature on rule compliance and the detection of corruption, es-
pecially in sports. For example, Duggan and Levitt (2002) uncover evidence that non-
linear payo®s in sumo wrestling lead to match ¯xing and Zitzewitz (2006) ¯nds that
Olympic judges favor athletes from their own country. Our ¯ndings on di±cult to detect
biases also relate to a larger class of rule-based goods and services beyond sports. For
example, the television quiz shows in the 1950s used biased rule enforcement to make
their shows more entertaining, by giving the most charismatic contestants answers in
advance Van Doren (2008). This type of blatant violation of the rules is likely a thing
of the past. However, our results suggest that even today it is possible that game
2Source: nba.com/news/stern transcript 080612.html.
3Our data are only available from the 2002-03 season onward, therefore, to test for improvement in o±ciating consis-
tency, the magnitude of the biases in the ¯rst and second half of the sample are compared.
4show ¯rms favor some contestants in a more subtle manner, perhaps by feeding them
questions on subjects they are known to be strong on or giving them weaker opponents.
Our paper also relates to research on the home advantage in sports, such as Sutter and Kocher
(2004), Garicano et al. (2005), Pettersson-Lidbom and Priks (2007), and Dohmen (2008).
Our paper expands upon these studies in a number of ways. First, these previous stud-
ies all use soccer data. It is important to con¯rm the home bias in another sport, since
the home bias may be especially strong in soccer as fans at soccer games are in general
louder, more active and more violent, sometimes even towards referees, than fans of
other sports. Second, these papers all focus on the home bias, while we analyze other
biases. Some of the existing ¯ndings do indicate bias towards keeping games close; e.g.,
Dohmen (2008) shows the home bias is stronger when the home team is losing and the
score is close, but these previous studies do not explicitly addresses this issue. Third,
the literature focuses on social pressure as the explanation for the bias. We expand upon
this interpretation and discuss another explanation for this bias: information-based per-
suasion.4 Nevill et al. (2002) indicates social pressure cannot fully account for referee
bias, as the authors conduct experiments showing that soccer referees watching game
footage on videotape are in°uenced by crowd reactions in isolated, laboratory settings.
This implies referees actually draw inferences about what the correct calls are from
the crowd reactions{that is, referees are persuaded by, or learn from, the crowd. This
phenomenon may partly explain the other biases we analyze.
Finally, our paper relates to other research on sports o±ciating bias. For exam-
ple, Price and Wolfers (2007), Parsons et al. (2007), and Larsen et al. (2008) all ¯nd
evidence of racial bias on the part of sports o±cials. Rodenberg and Winston (2009)
investigate whether NBA referees favor particular teams, and ¯nd little supporting ev-
idence. Anderson and Pierce (2009) and Zimmer and Kuethe (2009) also both study
biases of basketball referees. The former ¯nd evidence that college basketball referees
call more fouls against the visiting team and teams losing during games, and the lat-
ter ¯nd evidence that NBA referees have biases that extend playo® series and favor
teams from larger television markets in the playo®s. The key di®erence between their
4See DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2009) for a survey of the empirical literature on persuasion.
5papers and ours is our use of the discretionary/non-discretionary turnover distinction
for identi¯cation of referee bias separate from player behavior.
2 Hypotheses
The NBA's revenues in the 2006-07 season were $3.6 billion, $1.2 billion of which
were from ticket sales and $1 billion from national television sales (Badenhausen et al.
(2007)). One obstacle to continued revenue growth for the league is that the integrity of
the o±ciating seems to frequently be under ¯re. The widespread criticism of refereeing
caused the league itself to commission the \Pedowitz Report" in 2008 { a comprehensive
review of the o±ciating program, with a focus on the in°uence of gamblers and bookies.
The report states, \NBA management sends a clear and consistent message to referees
that they are to make accurate and consistent calls and favor no team or player. We
have found no evidence that the League has ever deviated from this message." The
report also documents the league's extensive system for monitoring the performance of
its o±cials. The study states that since the 2003-04 season the league has employed 30
\observers," one for each team, who attend every home game of their assigned team.
From the report: \After each game, the observer reviews the game on video, rates every
call, enters correct and incorrect non-calls, and includes some qualitative assessments
of performance."
The report, however, does not discuss empirical analysis of referee biases that po-
tentially enhance league pro¯ts. This section discusses hypotheses regarding three such
biases.5 While none of these biases are explicitly illegal, they undermine the credibility
of an industry that is based on a well-de¯ned set of rules that ensure fair treatment of
all teams.
Hypothesis 1: Referees favor home teams (home bias).
The ¯rst hypothesis follows a line of research on the source of the home team advan-
tage in sports. The conventional wisdom bought into by most fans and commentators
5There are numerous other biases that NBA referees are alleged to have, perhaps the most well known of which is
favoritism of \superstar" players. This favoritism could also be consistent with pro¯t-maximization, as the league may
bene¯t from having a small set of players thought by fans to be signi¯cantly better than others. We do not examine this
hypothesis in this paper, as we limit our scope to team-related biases.
6is that this advantage is due to teams simply playing better at home; they are moti-
vated by the crowd's support, more comfortable playing in a familiar environment, and
more rested while not traveling. This theory has been supported by research from other
disciplines, for example, Neave and Wolfson (2003) found higher levels of testosterone
in athletes while playing at home versus away, and suggest the desire to defend one's
\territory" as an explanation.
However, as discussed earlier, recent research indicates the home advantage is, at
least partly, due to referee bias. Favoring the home team may increase pro¯ts in at least
two ways. First, if the home team is more likely to win then attending games becomes
more enjoyable for most fans, thereby increasing their willingness to pay for tickets.
Second, if fans care about their home teams' game outcomes, and think their attendance
positively a®ects the team's probability of winning, then a bias that reinforces this belief
may also increase fans' willingness to pay.
Hypothesis 2: Referees favor teams losing during games to keep games close
(close bias).
Hypothesis 2 is motivated by the idea that close games are more entertaining to
watch, both in person and on television. Thus, a bias that keeps games arti¯cially close
would increase demand for television viewership, and possibly game tickets as well.
The Pedowitz Report discusses allegations of this bias, but again, does not test for it
empirically.6
Hypothesis 3: Referees favor teams down in playo® series in order to extend
the series (playo® bias).
The third hypothesis, referees favor teams in order to extend playo® series, concerns
the type of bias with the most direct impact on the NBA's bottom line. Playo® series
are best-of-seven; i.e., the ¯rst team to win four games wins the series. Thus, if the team
leading in the series has won three games, the series only continues if the trailing team
wins the subsequent game. Consequently, the league bene¯ts through ticket sales and
television revenues from longer playo® series.7 In fact, games \produced" by extending
6From Pedowitz (2008) (p.62), \A few ex-referees, including those who have held or hold supervisory positions with
the NBA describe Bavetta's [a current NBA referee] calls as re°ecting an e®ort to keep games close or to ingratiate
himself with a team."
7We were unable to determine whether league television revenues are directly tied to the number of playo® games.
7series would be particularly lucrative, since both ticket and television viewer demand is
higher for games that occur late in playo® series.8 The Pedowitz Report also discusses
allegations of this bias, but mainly how it may have a®ected just a few particular games.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data
We use play-by-play data obtained from ESPN.com for all NBA regular season and
playo® games from the 2002-03 through 2007-08 seasons. The play-by-play data provide
more detailed description of game events than game-level box-score data, allowing us to
disaggregate turnovers, which is the key to our empirical strategy.9 The play-by-play
data also include the exact time at which each game event occurred, allowing us to
analyze the e®ects of score changes within games. The downside to using play-by-play
data is that they are not o±cial league statistics, and may have more measurement
error than box score data (we drop observations in which less than ¯ve or greater than
40 points were scored by one team in a quarter due to likely error). This is not too
concerning, however, as the play-by-play data aggregated to the game-level are very
similar to the o±cial box score data, and the error should not bias our results towards
referee favoritism regardless.
The primary challenge to our analysis is that nearly all basketball statistics are
simultaneously a®ected by both referee and player behavior. Furthermore, it is likely
that player behavior does change in the situations in which we are testing for referee
bias. For example, players may play more con¯dently at home, or with more e®ort
when their team is losing during a game. We address this problem by exploiting the
detail in the play-by-play data to classify turnovers into two categories: \discretionary"
and \non-discretionary." Traveling violations, o®ensive fouls, three second violations,
However, even if they are not, there is a strong indirect relationship, as the value of televising the playo®s depends on
the expected number of games.
8It is worth noting that the league changed the format of the ¯rst round of the playo®s from best-of-¯ve to best-
of-seven starting in the 2003 playo®s. This change was ostensibly made to prevent °ukish, or undeserved, upsets, but
had the side e®ect of increasing the total number of playo® games. The change has a®ected a small percentage of series
outcomes; since then, 45 of the 48 teams to ¯rst win three games in ¯rst round series have proceeded to win a fourth
game.
9Pertinent basketball terms related to turnovers are de¯ned in Table 1.
8and o®ensive goal tending are classi¯ed as discretionary. These are all turnovers that
are called by a referee blowing his or her whistle while the ball is in play, and hence
would not have occurred without referee action. Both traveling violations and o®ensive
fouls, which comprise the vast majority of the discretionary turnovers, are notoriously
subjective and inconsistently called in the NBA, which also suggests they are statistics
relatively susceptible to bias.10 Three seconds and o®ensive goal-tending violations are
also categorized as discretionary, as they are called by a referee whistle with the ball in
play, but occur infrequently and bear little weight on the results.
Bad passes, lost balls, and shot clock violations are the turnover types classi¯ed as
non-discretionary. These turnovers are determined either directly by player behavior,
such as when a defensive player \steals" the ball from the o®ense, or when referees are
forced to make a call either because the ball has gone out of bounds or the shot clock
has expired; in either case refs have little discretion in making the call. Thus, there is a
clear distinction between the two types of turnovers: discretionary turnovers are called
by referees when the ball is in play and non-discretionary turnovers are not. We describe
formally how this distinction is used to test for bias in the following subsection.11
In addition to the turnover analysis, we also examine fouls, which are the more
frequently used measure of referee behavior. Unlike turnovers, it is more di±cult to
classify foul types by the degree of discretion referees have to judge them. Fouls are
still split into two categories for the analysis, shooting and non-shooting, since this is
also a natural distinction; however, it is not clear, a priori, which type is a®ected more
by player or referee behavior.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the turnover and foul types, aggregated to the
team-game-quarter level, used in the subsequent empirical work. The table also reports
tests of unconditional home-away and winning-losing, at start of quarter, di®erences in
10After the 2008-2009 season, Joe Borgia, the NBA's vice president of referee operations, claimed
\the current [turnover] rule is so confusing that it's impossible to tell if it allows one step or two,"
(sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3951002) and league management did in fact clarify the rule prior to the 2009-
2010 season, which is outside of our sample. The o®ensive foul is prone to manipulation due to players \°opping"
(pretending to fall down due to contact from o®ensive players), and there were reports that league management said
that it would begin punishing °oppers in May of 2008 after receiving pressure from fans and analysts (stopthe°op.net/)
but the policy was not actually implemented (nba.fanhouse.com/2008/12/29/so-much-for-the-nbas-°op-crackdown/).
11The names of the types of turnovers (\bad passes", \lost balls", etc.) are those used in the ESPN.com play-by-
play data. One type of turnover, double dribble violations, are dropped from the analysis. Although, according to the
de¯nition above, they are discretionary, they are arguably less subjective than the other discretionary turnover types.
However, these violations occur infrequently, and results are robust to including them in either turnover group.
9the various statistics. The table provides a preview of the econometric results, as both
home and losing teams have signi¯cant advantages in most discretionary turnover and
foul statistics, but not in non-discretionary turnovers.12
3.2 Formal Model
The following is a formal presentation of our identi¯cation strategy. We show how
referee bias can be cleanly detected using the discretionary/non-discretionary turnover
distinction with a few weak assumptions. For some ¯xed unit of game-time such as
a quarter, let TD be discretionary turnovers, TN be non-discretionary turnovers, XR
be a measure of referee favoritism (referee favoritism is increasing in XR), and XP be
a measure of player behavior (an increase in XP corresponds to a change in player
behavior that causes turnovers to decrease). Let Z be a variable that takes higher
values in situations in which favorable bias is hypothesized to occur; for example, Z
could be a dummy equal to one when the team is at home, losing during the game, or
trailing in the playo® series. As both XR and XP may be a®ected by Z, assume:
XR = °
R
0 + °
R
1 Z + ²1 (1)
XP = °
P
0 + °
P
1 Z + ²2: (2)
Z is assumed to be independent of ²1 and ²2. The hypothesis of interest is that °R
1 > 0;
the causal e®ect of Z on referee bias is positive.
The problem is that neither XR nor XP are observable and, consequently, equation
(1) cannot be directly estimated. Therefore, to test the hypothesis, additional assump-
tions are required. Suppose TD and TN are a®ected by both referee and player behavior
as follows:
lnTD = ¯
D
0 + ¯
D
1 XR + ¯
D
2 XP + u1 (3)
12O®ensive fouls are indeed turnovers, despite their name, both by de¯nition and in practice. By de¯nition, o®ensive
fouls cause o®ensive teams to turn the ball over to the defensive team without taking a shot, and o®ensive fouls are
o±cially recorded as turnovers and not recorded as personal fouls. In practice, the style of play which makes other
turnovers more likely (aggressive, risky play on o®ense) also makes o®ensive fouls more likely. Regardless, the estimated
biases are actually stronger when o®ensive fouls are dropped from the analysis.
10lnTN = ¯
N
0 + ¯
N
1 XR + ¯
N
2 XP + u2: (4)
In both equations, the X's are assumed to be independent of the u's. Equations (3) and
(4) are speci¯ed as log-linear so that the coe±cients can be interpreted as percentage
e®ects. To identify referee bias, two additional assumptions are made.
Assumption 3.1. ¯D
1 < ¯N
1 · 0.
Assumption 3.2. ¯N
2 · ¯D
2 · 0.
These assumptions seem highly plausible. Assumption 3.1 implies that, on average,
referee behavior has a greater percentage e®ect on the turnovers directly called by
referees (discretionary turnovers) than those not called by referees (non-discretionary).
Assumption 3.2 states that when player behavior changes in a way a®ecting turnovers
in general, the discretionary turnover percentage change is not greater (in magnitude)
than the non-discretionary change.
Then, by substituting (1) and (2) into (3) and (4) we obtain:
lnTD =
»
¯
D
0 + (¯
D
1 °
R
1 + ¯
D
2 °
P
1 )Z +
»
u1 (5)
lnTN =
»
¯
N
0 + (¯
N
1 °
R
1 + ¯
N
2 °
P
1 )Z +
»
u2: (6)
Here,
»
¯
D
0 = ¯D
0 +¯D
1 °R
0 +¯P
2 °N
0 and
»
u1 = ¯D
1 ²1 +¯D
2 ²2 +u1 and
»
¯
N
0 , and
»
u2 are de¯ned
analogously. Equations (5) and (6) can be estimated directly, as Z, TD and TN are
observable and the single RHS variable in each equation is independent of the error
term.
To test for the presence of referee bias, we ¯rst test whether Z is associated with an
advantage in discretionary turnovers. That is, we test whether the coe±cient on Z in
(5) is negative:
¯
D
1 °
R
1 + ¯
D
2 °
P
1 < 0 $
°
R
1 > ¡
¯D
2
¯D
1
°
P
1 : (7)
11Evidence of this inequality holding would be evidence of referee bias if °P
1 · 0. This is
because
¯D
2
¯D
1 ¸ 0 by Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, so if °P
1 · 0, then °R
1 > ¡
¯D
2
¯D
1 °P
1 implies
°R
1 > 0, which is equivalent to the existence of referee bias.
This test will not be su±cient, however, if °P
1 > 0. To account for this case, the
coe±cients on Z from equations (5) and (6) can be employed to test the following:
¯
D
1 °
R
1 + ¯
D
2 °
P
1 < ¯
N
1 °
R
1 + ¯
N
2 °
P
1 $
¯D
2 ¡ ¯N
2
¯N
1 ¡ ¯D
1
°
P
1 < °
R
1 : (8)
By Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2
¯D
2 ¡¯N
2
¯N
1 ¡¯D
1 ¸ 0, therefore, if °P
1 > 0 then
¯D
2 ¡¯N
2
¯N
1 ¡¯D
1 °P
1 < °R
1
implies °R
1 > 0. Thus, for all °P
1 , testing (7) and (8) is su±cient for testing °R
1 > 0 and,
thereby, identifying the existence of referee bias.
Practically speaking, to perform the hypothesis tests, equations (5) and (6) must
¯rst be separately estimated. Then, the coe±cient on Z from (5), ¯D
1 °R
1 + ¯D
2 °P
1 ,
must be signi¯cantly greater than zero and greater than the coe±cient on Z from (6),
¯N
1 °R
1 +¯N
2 °P
1 . It important to note that this test does not require that player behavior
a®ects both types of turnovers in the same way (i.e. it is not assumed that ¯D
2 = ¯N
2 ).
However, in order to isolate the magnitude of the bias, ¯D
1 °R
1 , additional assumptions
are required. By assuming ¯D
2 = ¯N
2 and ¯N
1 = 0, we can di®erence the estimates of
¯D
1 °R
1 + ¯D
2 °P
1 and ¯N
1 °R
1 + ¯N
2 °P
1 to obtain ¯D
1 °R
1 . Yet, these assumptions are fairly
strong and, therefore, we only refer to conservative approximations of estimates that
rely upon them.
4 Analysis
The analysis is based almost entirely on quarter-level data-sets. These allow us to
control for within-game dynamics in a simple, transparent way. Using quarter rather
than game-level data is necessary to avoid the hypothesized biases possibly interacting
with each other, which would confound the estimation results. For example, if referees
12indeed favor both home teams and teams losing during games, failing to control for
within-game scores could cause the varying biases to nullify each other. In this case,
home teams would be favored at the beginning of games when neither team is losing,
then home teams would be disfavored after taking the lead; therefore, in game-level
data home bias would be under-estimated. The downside of using quarter-level data is
that within-quarter dynamics are not as tightly controlled for. Consequently, as score
margins can change substantially within quarters, the magnitude of the close bias may
be underestimated.
The analysis of each hypothesis is performed using four unique dependent vari-
ables: shooting fouls, non-shooting fouls, discretionary turnovers, and non-discretionary
turnovers. As they are all count variable{each only takes non-negative integer values{
Poisson regression is the most appropriate estimation technique. The Poisson model is
estimated via maximum likelihood, under the assumption that the dependent variable
takes a Poisson distribution with log-mean equal to a linear function of the regressors.13
Log-linearity allows for estimates to be interpreted as percentage changes. However, a
disadvantage of using this model is that we are unable to obtain estimates of covari-
ances of the coe±cients across equations. For this reason, results of across-equation
tests are not reported. However, we are often able to show coe±cients are signi¯cantly
di®erent across equations for all feasible covariances (those with absolute value less
than the product of the standard errors). In the following subsections, unless otherwise
speci¯ed, any discussion of across-equation di®erences refers to signi¯cance levels for
all feasible covariances.
For each dependent variable two speci¯cations are examined; one with controls for
the team's performance in the quarter, and the other without any performance con-
trols. The controls are dummy variables representing score margin categories for the
quarter (\Score Margin Dummies").14 The bene¯t of including these variables is they
directly control for changes in player behavior. The cost is that they are determined
simultaneously with the dependent variables and, in fact, are caused in part by the
13The Poisson distribution assumption for a variable requires that its mean and variance are equal; Table 1 shows that
this is not problematic for our data. Results are very similar when we use other model speci¯cations.
14The categories are: lose quarter by more than ¯ve points, lose by one to ¯ve points, win by zero to ¯ve points.
Winning by more than ¯ve points is the omitted category.
13dependent variables. This misspeci¯cation is likely not problematic, as the coe±cients
on the score margin dummies are not of interest; if anything, since score margins are
also a®ected by referee behavior, including these variables weakens the estimates of ref-
eree bias. Finally, quarter ¯xed e®ects and \match-up" (team-opponent-season) ¯xed
e®ects are included in all models. Thus, our estimated e®ects are solely a result of
the variation in a team's performance from their mean performance against the same
opponent, in the same season. Including these ¯xed e®ects allows us to tightly control
for variation in team quality and the composition of game pairings.15
All analysis is conducted at the team-game-quarter level, using a sample with two
observations for each quarter of each game (one for each team). The ¯nal three minutes
of the fourth quarters are dropped, as game play often changes dramatically in those
situations. For example, losing teams sometimes intentionally commit more fouls in
those minutes for strategic reasons. Standard errors are clustered by game to account
for the repetition of game-quarters in the sample.
4.1 Home Bias
Table 2 provides the results from the Poisson regressions for the full sample. The home
team has approximately 8% to 11% fewer discretionary turnovers on average, but only
a 2% to -2% advantage in non-discretionary turnovers. The discretionary turnover
coe±cients are signi¯cantly greater than both zero and the non-discretionary turnover
coe±cients at the 1% level whether or not within-quarter performance is controlled
for, which, according to the argument detailed in Section 3.2, implies the existence of
referee bias. The home team also has a 5%-6% advantage in shooting fouls and a 1%
advantage in non-shooting fouls, signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 1% and 5%
levels, respectively.
The home advantage in discretionary turnovers also increases by more than 1% for
every 1,000 fans in attendance, which is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero and the non-
discretionary estimate at the 5% level. The estimated attendance e®ects are much
smaller for all of the other dependent variables, but also signi¯cantly di®erent from
15Results are similar when we simply use team-season/opponent-season ¯xed e®ects.
14zero at 5% for non-shooting fouls. The match-up ¯xed e®ects speci¯cation controls for
the possibility that player behavior and game attendance are both correlated with the
quality and type of game opponent. Consequently, the signi¯cant attendance result is
not simply caused by teams playing di®erently against, say, better opponents, which
also attract larger crowds.
Additionally, in results not reported, we ¯nd the home bias is not a®ected by whether
the game is televised or occurs in the playo®s, though bias is estimated to increase by
4% for discretionary turnovers in the playo®s. The home bias is also una®ected by
whether the game took place in the 2005-06 season or later; however, home teams do
enjoy a greater in advantage in non-shooting fouls in later seasons. These ¯ndings
suggest that the home bias has not been reduced over the last several years, despite the
NBA's implementation of more intense referee monitoring.16
4.2 Close Bias
Estimation results reported in Table 2 also support the close bias hypothesis, as teams
trailing at the start of a quarter are systematically favored throughout the subsequent
period. Using a set of dummy variables that account for start of quarter score di®er-
ence,17 we ¯nd that as the score margin grows the losing team receives increasingly
favorable treatment, in terms of discretionary turnovers, from the referees. When a
team trails by more than 10 points at the start of a quarter it has 10% fewer dis-
cretionary turnovers in the subsequent quarter, relative to teams who start a quarter
trailing or winning by no more than three points; however, teams losing by a wide
margin actually commit more non-discretionary than teams winning or losing by a slim
margin. The estimates for the two types of turnovers are di®erent at the 1% level, so
there is strong evidence of bias in favor of teams down by large margins. Furthermore,
teams down by moderate margins appear to be favored, as teams losing by 4-10 points
16We also tested for whether the home bias is stronger in the fourth quarter, and found that it was not. Since the
crowd is generally strongest in those situations, this result is, at face-value, surprising. It can be explained, however,
by the referee convention of making fewer calls at the end of games, so as to \let the players decide the games." This
convention may exist partly because those calls are more highly scrutinized.
17The categories are \home team down more than 10 points", \home team down by 10 to 4 points", \home team
winning by 4 to 10 points", and \home team winning by more than 10 points." Dummy variables are used in place of
a linear measure of start quarter score di®erence to allow for the possibility that score di®erence has a non-linear e®ect
on referee bias. Results are similar when we use a simple linear score di®erence variable.
15have over 5% fewer discretionary turnovers than baseline teams, which is signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero at the 1% level, and signi¯cantly di®erent from the non-discretionary
turnover estimate at the 5% level. Results are robust to whether or not controls are
included for within-quarter performance. The di®erences between estimates of discre-
tionary and non-discretionary turnover e®ects for teams up by 4-10 points and greater
than 10 points are small. Losing teams commit 2-4% fewer shooting fouls, and winning
teams commit more shooting and non-shooting fouls than teams in close games, but
again, it is less clear how to interpret these estimates with respect to bias. We do not
¯nd any di®erences in the close bias based on whether the game is nationally televised
or a playo® game, nor do we ¯nd that this bias has decreased over time.
4.3 Playo® Bias
Our third hypothesis is that the league attempts to extend multi-game playo® series by
favoring the team that is close to elimination.18 Although this theory is especially well
known and easy to link to direct revenue increases, investigating it is relatively di±cult
due to the limited number of playo® series in the data sample. We start by looking
at mean game-level turnover di®erences, categorized by playo® series score, which are
graphed in Figure 1. The data are grouped by the win-loss record of the home team
for the series coming into the game, and ordered by the approximate degree to which
the home team winning would a®ect the length of the series.19 Points on the left part
of the ¯gure represent games in which home team wins are more likely to extend the
series, and points on the right represent games in which away team wins are more likely
to extend the series. The sample sizes are especially small for games in which the home
team is up 2-0 and 3-0 (four and two, respectively), as the visiting team rarely wins the
¯rst two games of a series.20
18We have also tested for another alleged playo® bias: that the league favors large market teams in all playo®s games,
not just those that would extend the series, to increase television ratings of the later playo® rounds. We ¯nd no evidence
that large market teams have an advantage in discretionary turnovers and, therefore, do not report results.
19There are 16 playo® teams and four playo® rounds. Each round consists of paired match-ups between the teams,
each of which consists of a best-of-seven series. Thus, there are 16 possible series scores (home wins-away wins) at the
start of each playo® game.
20The team with the better regular season record is the home team for the ¯rst two games of each playo® series. Thus,
in cases when the home team is leading 2-0 or 3-0, the team with the worse regular season record has won the ¯rst two
games of the series despite being on the road, which happens very rarely.
16The ¯gure indicates two patterns. First, most of the points for discretionary fouls
lie below zero (the horizontal axis), which is consistent with the home bias discussed
earlier. Second, the home team's advantage is larger in games in which the home team
winning would be more likely to extend the series. Both of these patterns are weaker
for non-discretionary turnovers. As a rough statistical check, two linear predictions are
¯tted to the data, one for each type of turnover. The discretionary turnover line is
positively sloped and steeper than that of non-discretionary turnovers, which supports
the playo® bias hypothesis.
To formally test the hypothesis, we use Poisson regression models similar to those
described above, with two main di®erences. First, the sample is restricted to only
include playo® games, and second, two new binary variables, \Bias For" and \Bias
Against" are added to the models. Bias For is equal to one when the team is down
in the series by at least two games or facing elimination (down 0-2, 0-3, 1-3 or 2-3)
at the start of the game, as these are situations in which teams are most likely to be
favored. Bias Against is de¯ned analogously. The series score 0-2 is included in Bias
For situations because a win by the trailing team in this situation is likely to extend
the series length; a loss by the trailing team would render the series e®ectively over, as
no team has ever won a series after falling behind 0-3.
When we estimate a Poisson regression of discretionary turnovers on just the Bias
For and Bias Against variables, we obtain coe±cients of -0.065 and 0.097, respectively,
indicating teams facing elimination in the series or down 0-2 receive a 16.2% discre-
tionary turnover advantage, signi¯cant at the 1% level. When the same regression is
estimated using non-discretionary turnovers as the dependent variable, the coe±cients
are equal to -0.007 and -0.018 and are not signi¯cantly di®erent. These results con¯rm
the patterns displayed in Figure 1; discretionary turnovers are called less frequently for
teams whose wins likely lengthen the series, while non-discretionary turnovers appear
independent of series status. The estimates do not, however, account for confounding
variables, such as home status, attendance, team quality, etc. Simply controlling for
home game reduces the discretionary turnover advantage to 11.0%.
Table 3 presents estimation results from models that incorporate the full set of
17control variables, including match-up controls.21 While the bias variable coe±cient
estimates are generally not signi¯cant, teams down 0-2, 0-3, 1-3 or 2-3 do have an
11.7% advantage over their opponents in discretionary turnovers (which is signi¯cant
at the 5% level) in the speci¯cation controlling for current quarter performance.22 The
advantage is not signi¯cant, however, for any other statistical category { including
non-discretionary turnovers. The advantage is 2.9% for shooting fouls, but is -1.6%
for non-shooting fouls. Due to the relatively small sample and large standard errors,
the discretionary turnover estimates are not signi¯cantly di®erent from those for non-
discretionary turnovers for all feasible covariances. Still, the results provide strong
suggestive evidence that teams are favored in ways consistent with our hypothesis.
Since the playo® bias has greater (potential) direct e®ects on revenues than the other
biases, we also examine whether the bias changes in more pivotal game situations. To
do this we construct a new, minute-level data set, and de¯ne a dummy variable equal to
one in minutes that occur in the fourth quarter with a score margin at the start of the
minute of ¯ve or fewer points. This de¯nition of the dummy variable is admittedly ad
hoc, but the results are robust to de¯ning it in di®erent ways. The dummy variable is
interacted with the Bias For and Bias Against variables, and the estimation results are
reported in Table 5. The interaction terms are largely insigni¯cant, and the signs for
the discretionary turnover estimates are not consistent with explicit bias. The results
imply the discretionary turnover playo® bias disappears in these critical game minutes,
perhaps as a consequence of improved referee performance in more important game
situations. It is also of note that the non-interacted newly constructed dummy variable
estimate is substantial and signi¯cant only for non-discretionary turnovers, indicating
that this is the only one of the four dependent variables highly a®ected by changes in
style of play in more consequential game situations. Finally, we test whether the bias is
larger in series between large television market teams, and if the bias has changed over
time. In general, these results are neither statistically nor economically signi¯cant.23
21The match-up controls are quarter-level means from the regular season games between the two teams. For simplicity
and due to Table 2 indicating only minor non-linear e®ects, a linear term is used to control for start of quarter score
di®erence.
22The 11.7% advantage is calculated by subtracting the Bias Against estimate, .068, from the Bias For estimate, -.049.
In the other speci¯cation, the estimated advantage has a (two-sided) p-value of 0.1057.
23To examine the connection between television market size and playo® bias, we test whether the advantage of teams
185 Discussion
We have presented strong evidence that home teams, teams losing during games,
and teams losing in playo® series, have a relatively large advantage in discretionary
turnovers, and almost no advantage in non-discretionary turnovers. We consider this
indicative of referee bias, since the ¯rst type of turnover is determined directly by ref-
eree actions, and the second directly by player actions. While we cannot completely
rule out the possibility that both turnover types are caused entirely by player actions
(and referees are on average completely neutral), we think it is extremely unlikely that
this is the case, especially since the pattern is so consistent for the three di®erent types
of game situations.
We have not yet addressed possible causes of the biases. Our prior is that they are
caused by psychosocial factors and cognitive error. Home bias may be caused by social
pressure from fans at the arena (as discussed by previous literature) or information
transmission, or persuasion, from fans. Close bias could be caused by referees favoring
trailing teams out of sympathy for the losing players and coach, to make up for previous
calls that favored the winning team, or because losing teams plead for favorable calls
relatively often (persuasion). The playo® bias could be due to referees unconsciously
favoring the losing team to support the \underdog," or teams losing in playo® series
pleading for calls more strongly than the teams up in the series. It is also plausible that
the home crowd is stronger in playo® games in which the home team is near elimination.
Alternatively, the biases may be done intentionally to promote league revenue.
Our auxiliary empirical results appear to mainly support our prior. The estimated
positive e®ect of attendance on home bias is consistent with the bias being caused by
social pressure and/or persuasion from the crowd. The insigni¯cant e®ects of national
television and playo® status of games on the home and close biases indicate unconscious
bias, since these variables are likely independent of psychological factors but correlated
with the revenue e®ects of bias.24 The ¯ndings that the playo® bias does not increase
hypothesized to be favored increases as the total Nielsen television market size of the two teams increases. We do not
report these results in the interest of brevity, but they are available upon request.
24For example, if the magnitude of the close bias increased during nationally televised games, in which the returns
to close games are higher, it would indicate the bias is an intentional means to increase pro¯ts, since television status
should have less e®ect on the psychological factors that could cause close bias.
19in critical minutes of games or in series between large television market teams are also
consistent with bias not being an intentional means of increasing pro¯ts.
Another question we address is, given that the playo® bias is not done intentionally
to increase pro¯ts, is it caused mainly by increased home bias (since the home crowd
is likely more active in playo® games in which the home team is near elimination). We
analyze this issue by recoding the Bias For (Bias Against) variables discussed in Section
4.3 to equal one for home (away) teams in games in which the series score is 3-3. The
home crowd should be strongest in those double-elimination games. We ¯nd both the
magnitude and signi¯cance of the playo® bias decrease, and interpret this to mean the
increased home bias is not the entire source of the playo® bias.
It is also worth noting that the estimated e®ects of variables representing possible
bias on discretionary turnovers are generally substantially larger than the estimated
e®ects on both types of fouls. We do not draw formal conclusions from these results due
to the identi¯cation problem for fouls, but speculate it is unlikely that player behavior
systematically a®ects discretionary turnovers more than fouls. Thus, even if the foul
e®ects were caused by bias, the bias a®ecting discretionary turnovers would seem to be
more severe. It is unclear how to interpret these results with respect to the league's
pro¯t motive, however. It is possible the league allows greater bias for discretionary
turnovers since they are not reported in box scores and, thus, less observable to fans
and analysts. On the other hand, it is possible discretionary turnovers are more di±cult
to judge and inherently more subjective than fouls, and consequently it is more costly
for the league to eliminate bias a®ecting discretionary turnovers.
We conclude by discussing bias mitigation. We assume it is in the interests of
both league management and fans to reduce the biases, since their suspicious nature
may cause fan enjoyment of the sport to decrease, independent of the biases' source.
The biases may be reduced by league management more carefully monitoring referee
behavior, especially regarding discretionary turnovers, in the situations the analysis was
focused on. We should note it is possible to excessively monitor the referees, and the
NBA should be careful not to become overzealous in its supervision o±cials. This could
create a host of new problems, as, for example, referees might feel compelled to make
20calls in one game to make up for perceived disparities in previous games. Hopefully,
simply calling attention to and raising awareness of the biases will help to alleviate
them. We also think the league's clarifying the traveling rule in 2009 may be bene¯cial.
Similarly, clarifying rules regarding o®ensive fouls (increasing the penalties for °opping)
could help in the future. Finally, it might be helpful to report traveling and o®ensive
foul violations separately from other turnovers in box scores and for the league to make
public its internal reports on o±ciating. In general, being sure rules are de¯ned clearly
and appropriately, and making data on rule compliance public may be the ideal (i.e.,
lowest cost) way for both the NBA and organizations in general to improve compliance
and reduce suspicion about lack of compliance.
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Table 1: De¯nitions of Turnover-Related Basketball Terms
Term De¯nition
Turnover The o®ensive team loses possession of the ball without making a shot attempt.
Travel* Progressing in any direction while in possession of the ball [without dribbling],
which is in excess of prescribed limits as noted in Rule 10-Section XIV.
Three seconds An o®ensive player remains in the painted lane in front of the basket
for more than three consecutive seconds.
O®ensive Goal-Tend A player interferes with the ball when it is on a downward trajectory
or is in an extended cylinder-shaped region above the rim.
O®ensive foul* Illegal contact committed by the o®ensive player.
Shot clock The o®ensive team fails to take a shot that hits the rim within 24 seconds of possession.
Notes: De¯nitions for terms with * from: http://www.basketball.com/nba/rules/rule4.shtml#IV (de¯nitions for other
terms unavailable).
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26Table 5: Playo®s Only, Minute-Level Sample
Disc. TOs Shoot. Fouls Non-Shoot. Fouls Non-Disc. TOs
Bias For -0.051 -0.054* 0.048 -0.021
(0.056) (0.028) (0.030) (0.034)
Bias Against 0.074* -0.019 0.033 -0.042
(0.045) (0.029) (0.031) (0.034)
Home Game -0.126*** -0.056*** -0.031 -0.034
(0.036) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024)
Attendance £ Home -0.067*** 0.008 -0.019* -0.005
(0.022) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Bias For £ Critical 0.133 0.134 -0.026 0.131
(0.179) (0.101) (0.102) (0.119)
Bias Against £ Critical -0.286 0.002 -0.013 0.254*
(0.185) (0.107) (0.100) (0.134)
Home £ Critical -0.201 -0.101 -0.005 0.053
(0.129) (0.071) (0.074) (0.096)
Critical 0.055 0.082 0.115* -0.271***
(0.094) (0.059) (0.063) (0.083)
p-value for H0:
Bias For = Bias Away 0.0403 0.2772 0.6533 0.6419
BF £ Critical = BA £ Critical 0.0617 0.2208 0.9059 0.4449
BF + (BF£Crit) = BA + (BA£Crit) 0.1784 0.3566 0.9848 0.5254
Notes: N = 44,532. Poisson models with match-up (team-opponent-season) ¯xed e®ects (regular season means), and
de-meaned attendance included in all speci¯cations. Bias For = 1 if team down in series 0-2, 0-3, 1-3, 2-3; 0 otherwise.
Bias Against = 1 if team up in series 2-0, 3-0, 3-1, 3-2; 0 otherwise. Critical = 1 if minute occurs in 4th quarter and
minute-start score margin less than 6. Robust standard errors clustered by game. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1%
signi¯cance.
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